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Y MEMORANDUM

--(

-~~

Aope a 1 from M.D. Pa

~ Muir)

~

~

v.
Federal/Civil

ROY
0

1. SUMMARY:

Timely (w/
extn)

-

Appees refused, for religious reasons, to ob-

tain a social security number for their daughter and to provide
that number to the state welfare agency.

Because provision of

this information is a statutory prerequisite to receiving benefits for the daughter under federal-state welfare programs, the

.......

state agency

~

-Pn

~.~;u' o. Je"'-S~ v.

- L-disC~-

~;~

L.

/

tending that the application of the statutory requirement violatj

ed their rights under the Free Exercise Clause,
agreed.
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

·I

a~d

the DC

----

Appee Roy is a Native Amer-

ican descended from the Abenaki Tribe.

-

A central part of Roy's

religious beliefs concerns the legend of Katahdin, which warns of

-

Roy has interpreted this legend to be a warn-

the "great evil."

ing about the use of com uters.

He considers social security

numbers (SSNs) to be part of the "great evil," because they are
"used by computers," and he believes that such use robs the spirit of the person identified by the number.

He ascribes this ef-

feet to any unique numerical identifier that is used by a computer.
Under 7

u.s.c.

§2025(e) and 42

u.s.c.

§602(a) (25) , 1 house-

holds participating in the food stamp and AFDC programs must furnish their state welfare agencies with the SSN of each member of
the household.

Appee Roy and his wife, appee Miller, were re-

----

ceiving aid for their children under these programs when, in
April 1982, state welfare personnel informed them that they had
failed to provide aSSN for their (then) two-year-old daughter,
Little Bird of the Snow.

Roy refused to obtain and provide a SSN

for Little Bird of the Snow because of his religiously motivated
fear that use of this number by the government's computers would

1 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 494, moved the SSN requirement of the AFDC program from 42
u.s.c. 602(a) (25) to a new section of the Social Security Act.
See 98 Stat., at 1147.

rob her spirit and prevent her from attaining
Because of this refusal, the state agency

"gr~ater

termina ~ed

power."

the benefits

for Little Bird of the Snow under the AFDC program and initiated
proceedings to discontinue food stamps for Little Bird of the
Snow.
Appees then commenced this suit against the Sec. of the Pa.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 2 the Sec. of HHS, and the Sec. of Agriculture, challenging the constitutionality of the SSN requirement
as applied in their case.

~he

case was tried on the assumption

that Little Bird of the Snow did not have a SSN and that it would
violate Roy's beliefs to obtain one for her, but on the last day

(

of trial it came out that appee Miller had obtained a SSN for
Little
Bird of the Snow shortly after the daughter's birth.
_____.
The DC held for appees.

It first rejected appts' suggestion

that the case became moot once it was learned that Little Bird of
the Snow already had a SSN.

The court reasoned that Roy's reli~I

\\

gious objection went more to the use of the SSN than to its mere
establishment, and that appees' desire to obtain welfare benefits
without the government's using Little Bird of the Snow's SSN
saved the case from mootness.

The court then concluded that

Roy's beliefs were religious in nature and sincerely held.

2 Defendant Cohen, the Sec. of the Pa. welfare agency, did not
appeal the DC's judgment. This memo's statement of the facts
refers to all three defendants simply as "appts." Cohen has
filed a very brief "response" in support of the jurisdictional
statement. Because this response says nothing that is not said
better by the jurisdictional statement, this memo does not
discuss separately the response's contentions.

/
The DC next examined the governmental

inter~sts

at stake.

'

It acknowledged that the SSN requirement furthere ~ the "substantial" governmental interests in preventing welfare fraud and
abuse and in facilitating accurate and efficient identification
of recipients and calculation of benefits.

~-----""""'\

'-""

Nevertheless, the DC

a religious exemption from the requirement.

The DC

applied the following test in reaching this conclusion:
"[T]he Plaintiffs [may] prevail on their free exercise claim
only if they ••• show that the governmental interests served
by the social security number requirement could be served by
some reasonable alternative means which would not burden the
Plaintiffs' first amendment rights. In other words, if
holding that the Plaintiffs' objection to the social security number requirement entitles them to an exemption from the
requirement would substantially burden the benefit programs
involved in this case by, for example, involving a cost so
great that the efficient operation of the programs would be
effected or by creating a substantial likelihood of chaos in
the system resulting from a proliferation of claims to exemptions from the requirement, then the governments' interest should be held superior to the Plaintiffs' right to exercise their religious beliefs." Id., at 16a (emphasis in
original).
--Because the nature of Roy's belief is so unusual, the--...,.DC

~

reasoned, no more than a handful of persons would be likely to
request exemptions like that requested by Roy.

"Thus, the Gov-

ernment's general interest in enforcement of the social security
number requirement would not appear to be threatened by a holding
in favor of the Plaintiffs in this case."

Id., at 18a-19a.

Fur-

ther, the governmental interest in denying the particular exemption requested here is insignificant.

There was no evidence that

anyone else receiving welfare benefits was using the name Little
Bird of the Snow, and other data in the girl's computer file
(e.g., date of birth) could also be used for cross-matching of

..

computer files to prevent fraud or abuse. 3
I

The DC concluded that appees were constituti +nally entitled
to the exemption requested.

It enjoined appts from denying bene-

fits to appees for Little Bird of the Snow because of appees'
failure to provide aSSN for her.

The court also enjoined appt

Heckler from using or disseminating the SSN already assigned to
Little Bird of the Snow, and it ordered her to "notify any agency, individual, business entity or other third party to which the
number has been provided and demand that said agency permanently
refrain from:

(1) making any use of the number and (2) dissemi-

nating the number to any other agency, person, individual, business entity, or any other third party."

App. to Pet. for Cert.

24a-25a.
3. CONTENTIONS:

Appts contend that the DC erred by consid-

ering appees' claim in isolation and ignoring the compelling
"programmatic governmental interests" in verifying eligibility,
preventing and detecting fraud, and promoting efficient administrat'on of massive government programs.
counter to that of United States v. Lee

from paying social security taxes for his
that case, the Court did not confine its

The DC's analysis runs

u.s.

252 (1982),

mish employees.

In

nalysis to the effect

3 Roy's religious beliefs are not of ended by computer
processing of a file on his daught r that uses her name as the
identifier for the file: Roy beli es that his daughter's name
will protect her from evil.

Instead, it looked to the government's compelling interest in
I

I

uniform administration of the program and of tax collection in
I

general and concluded that mandatory participation by all employers was essential to the fiscal vitality of the program.
id., at 258-260.

See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366

(1961): Prince v. Massachusetts, 321

u.s.

u.s.

158 (1944).

See
599, 608

The perti-

nent point, according to appts, is that the AFDC and food stamp
programs as a whole cannot be managed effectively without the SSN
requirement: it is not relevant that granting exemptions in rare
cases might work only a minute or incremental interference with
the governmental interest.
The appts also argue that, under the DC's reasoning, individuals with the most idiosyncratic beliefs enjoy the strongest
entitlement to accommodation, because the burden of accommodating
such beliefs will be less than that of accommodating beliefs more
widely held.

Appts consider such a result anomalous.

Similarly,

appts suggest that there would be no limit to the accommodations
that could be required of the government under the DC's analysis.
A welfare recipient with religious objections to the use of numbers on checks could insist that the government pay him by cash.
Viewing each case in isolation, as the DC's approach requires,
the government would be obliged to accede to these types of demands, because it clearly could do so in a handful of instances
without undue burden and expense.
Finally, appts assert that the DC's relief is overbroad insofar as it enjoins Sec. Heckler from using or disseminating Little Bird of the Snow's SSN.

No decision of this Court holds that

the Free Exercise Clause protects an individual

~rom

having his

I

religious sensibilities offended by observing actl ons of government to which he objects.
that the government's interest in
preventing we

are fraud and abuse is not a compelling governmen-

tal interest, and they cite Sherbert and Thomas as support for
this proposition.
Second, appees assert that appts' dispute essentially is
with the DC's "finding of fact" that the government's interest
can be adequately served
of the Snow.

w~ng

a SSN for Little Bird

The government's ability to connuct computer

searches is irrelevant, because it is undisputed that Little Bird
of the Snow is eligible for the benefits claimed, and in any
event the DC found that the government could effectively conduct
computer searches for Little Bird of the Snow without a SSN for
her.

Because the DC's "finding of fact" is not clearly errone-

ous, appts' contentions do not present a substantial federal
question.

As a more general matter, allowing religious exemp-

tions from the SSN requirement will not hamper the operation of
the welfare programs, because, as the DC found, a person's file
can be adequately identified by the other data in the file and
there is no significant threat of a proliferation of claims to
exemptions from the SSN requirement.

Thus, appts are incorrect

in asserting that the DC failed to consider the "programmatic"
interests of the government.

In addition, the small number of

potential claims for religious exemptions distinguishes this case
from United States v •

.

',·

hich emphasized the risk of "myriad

77

exceptions flowin

---·

455

-----...._,.

u.s.,

__

from a wide variety of religious beliefs."
I

at 260.

Third, appees point out that the DC's decision is consistent
with the decisions of other courts that have addressed the same
issue.

See Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 (CA9 1984): Stevens

v. Berger, 428 F.Supp. 896 (EDNY 1977): Atwood v. Idaho Dept. of
Health

&

Welfare, No. 83-3066 (D. Idaho Oct. 16, 1984)

government's motion for summary judgment).

(denying

But see Mullaney v.

Woods, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
Fourth, the DC's reasoning is faithful to the principle established by this Court's precedent that religious accommodation
must be made as long as the accommodation does not undermine the
purpose of the statutory requirement.

Thomas, Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert required accommodation
for this reason.

Similarly, in Lee, Braunfeld, and Prince, the

Court rejected Free Exercise claims for accommodation because the
requested exemption would itself undermine the relevant statutory
purpose.

As noted above, the DC concluded that granting a reli-

gious exemption from the SSN requirement would not impair the
purposes of the requirement.
Fifth, appees assert that cutting off their welfare benefits
because of their failure to comply with the SSN requirement would
be inconsistent with Congress' general intent to provide assistance to all eligible recipients regardless of religious creed.
Finally, appees urge, the DC's relief is not overbroad.

Use

of Little Bird of the Snow's SSN would directly and irreparably
injure Roy in his religious beliefs •

..

In their reply brief, appts respond that appees seriously
•'
misstate appts' argument.
Like the DC, appees fdcus solely on
the number of persons who potentially might seek a religious exemption from the SSN requirement.

This approach ignores the

larger "programmatic interests" served by the requirement.
Appts' argument is that the government may be required to adopt a
less restrictive alternative in the case of a particular plaintiff only if the government's programmatic interests would be
served equally well by making that alternative applicable to the
populace as a whole

regardless of how many persons are likely

to claim exemptions.
4. DISCUSSION:

Viewed in the context of the balancing ap-

proach the Court has used in its accommodation cases, appts'
principal argument is nonsensical.

Appts concede that few

peop r.~

would be likely to claim exemptions from the SSN requirement on
the basis of either actual or feigned religious beliefs.

~

If

granting a religious exemption to a statutory requirement does
not threaten the "programmatic interests" behind the requirement,
then under a balancing approach those interests are irrelevant to
the question whether the exemption must be granted.

Under the

balancing approach the Court has used, it is the restriction of
religious liberty that itself must be essential to accomplishing
a compelling governmental interest, not (as appts argue) the general governmental program or requirement that causes the restriction of liberty.

See Bob Jones University v. United States, 103

S.Ct. 2017, 2035 (1983): United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 257258.

In Lee, the Court did consider the broader interests behind

mandatory participation in the social security system, but only
'
because it perceived that granting religious exem~tions would
significantly threaten those interests.

See 455

u.s.,

at 260;

id., at 263 {STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment).
Appts' argument thus makes sense only if viewed as a sugges-

-

tion that the Court reject the balancing approach it has previ"'---- ' - - ---.___ ~
"'-- ""'-- "'-- ...__. '----'---- '
ously employed. From this perspective, the argument has merit.
~

The government does have legitimate general interests in enforcing facially neutral laws uniformly and in not being put to a
choice between either acceding to or litigating every bizarre
religious objection to an otherwise valid law.

v

similar to the views advanced by JUSTICES
See Lee, 455

u.s.,

~his

position is
~

REHNQUIS~

and STEVENS.

at 262, 263, n. 3 {STEVENS, J., concurring in

the judgment); Thomas, 450

u.s.,

at 723 {REHNQUIST, J., dissent-

ing) •
In any event, this case must at least be held for Jensen v.
Quaring, No. 83-1944, which concerns a religiously motivated
claim for exemption from Nebraska's photograph requirement for
drivers' licenses.

In terms of the nature of the plaintiffs'

claims and of the governments' interests, the two cases are obviously very similar.

Moreover, the government's interests in the

instant case would appear to be stronger than those in Quaring,
inasmuch as the Nebraska statute {unlike the federal statutes
here) grants certain exemptions from the photograph requirement.
Thus a victory for the state in Quaring would entail a reversal
or remand in this case.

Further, I believe that this case deserves

~lenary

review on

Notwithstanding appts' concessions, on~ could argue

its own.

hat the DC erred in applying the "traditional" balancing test by
...:;:o...-~

_,_

ot adequately considering the economic incentive that its hold---~~~~
appli~ants to feign

ing would create for welfare recipients or

-

---

~~~""\..._.

"'- ~

religious conversions in order to prevent government agencies
~

from identifying their files with unique numerical identifiers.
Cf. Lee, 455 U.S., at 264, n.3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the
judgment).

More significantly, the DC's unprecedented conclusion

that the mere use by the government of Little Bird of the Snow's
SSN would violate Roy's Free Exercise rights could have sweeping
implications.

Nothing in the DC's opinion qualifies or restricts

this conclusion.

I would imagine, therefore, that the Court

would want at least to limit this part of the DC's holding.

Fi-

nally, if the Court wishes to address directly the argument that
the government is making here, this case offers a much stronger
factual basis for the government's position than Quaring does, in
that the statutes here do not permit exemptions.
-------~--~~------I recommend NPJ.
Appees have moved for leave to proceed IFP.

IFP status ap-

pears to be proper.
There is a motion to affirm, a "response" in support of the
jurisdictional statement, and a reply brief.
January 3, 1985

Lightsey

Opn in juris. stmt.

0
alb

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: No. 83-1944, Jensen v. Quaring

This case was argued in January, and the Co
voted 5-3 to reverse the judgment of CAS.
opinion and a dissent circulated on May 24, Just' e Blackmun,
originally a member of the majority, changed h's vote.
Therefore, unless the case is reargued, it

by an

As you will

Chief has asked

you to umove for reargument or vote

when a motion is made-

equally divided Court.

-as it surely will be.u

Although I a

general drivers'
licenses display a color picture of the licensee.

There is no

provision for individualized exemptions from the photograph
requirement, and none has been made.

The respondent here has

passed the requisite written examination and driving test.
Nevertheless, she cannot acquire a license because she has
refused to be photographed.

She sincerely believes that the

1
' Second Commandment' prohibits the making or possession of

_____..,.

photographs .I

Without a drivers' license, respondent is uable to

...,

manage her herd of cattle or to drive to a neighbdring town where ·
·'· I
she has a part-time job as a bookkeeper.
~~
lo

CA8
held that the State's failure to grant respondent a
____.-?
license violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise
of religion.

The court found that the State had placed a burden

on the exercise of respondent's religious beliefs by conditioning
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct forbidden by her
beliefs.

It held that petitioner could justify this restriction

on respondent's religious liberty only by demonstrating that it
was the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling
state interest.

The court concluded that because the State

provides certain types of licenses without photographs

(~,

learner's permits), there was no compelling reason for denying
selective exemptions based on religious objections to the license
requirement.

--

The Court opinion circulated by the Chief reverses the
judgment of CA8.

-

The opinion states that the court below should

not have applied the compelling state interest standard.
Although th~ Court acknowledges that this standard should be used
in a case where the challenged legislation makes a person's
religious practices unlawful, it asserts that a different
standard should be used when the statute imposes only an indirect
or ------------------------------------~----~---------~-----incidental burden. When the burden is indirect, a "neutral
~

and uniformly applicable" statute may be enforced if it
represents a "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest."

'·

•.

The dissent points out that "once it has 'been shown that
i

'I

a government regulation burdens the free exercise bf religion,
this Court has consistently asked the government to demonstrate
/1

that ..•

,,

[it] represents 'the least restrictive means of

achieving some compelling state interest.'"
quoting Thomas v. Review Board, 450

u.s.

Dissent at 4,

707, 718 (1981}.

Applying this standard to the case at hand, the dissent concludes
that "Nebraska's interests can be fully vindicated without
burdening Mrs. Quaring's free exercise of religion."

This

conclusion is unremarkable, given the information submitted by
respondent in a post-argument brief.

On February 1, 1985,

petitioner, the Director of the Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
testified before the state legislature in support of a bill to
eliminate drivers' license photographs for budgetary reasons.
She testified: "It's my feeling age, hair color, eye color,
height and weight are enough to verify that this is the person
holding the license."

Governor Kerrey agreed, stating that

elimination of the photograph is "not something that would
interfere with law enforcement •••• "

The dissent states that in

light of this candid testimony, "the petitioners cannot credibly
assert that issuing Mrs. Quaring a license with a written rather
than photographic description undermines its overall program of
driver identification or its goal of allowing only qualified
drivers to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Nebraska."
The dissent is probably correct in asserting that the
Chief's approach constitutes a

'break

~
with precedent.

In the

past, the Court has required that a statute represent the least

restrictive means of achieving a compelling state 1interest.
.

~'

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

u.s.

~~

See,

205 (1972); Thd&as v. Review
,\

Board, 450
(1963).

u.s.

707 (1980); Sherbert v. Verner, 374

u.s.

398

The Chief's attempt to distinguish the prior cases is

not very persuasive.

First, he asserts that many of the earlier

~-----------

cases have involved "affirmative compulsion or prohibition"--he
contends that statutes imposing only an indirect burden are
different.

But this Court always has refused to distinguish

between direct and indirect burdens.
Thomas, supra.

See Sherbert, supra, and

It makes little sense to say that a state may not

impose a $100 fine on church-goers, but that it may give $100 to
all persons who do not attend church.

Second, the Chief does not

explain adequately why Sherbert and Thomas, cases involving
indirect burdens, are distinguishable.

It does not seem to me

that a different standard should be invoked here simply because
the Nebraska statute does not have a "mechanism for
individualized exemptions."
Although the Chief's approach seems to be inconsistent
with prior decisions of this Court, I am not
view.

-

u~ sympa~ is 0 \

With the proliferation of different religious sects,

~

government regulation increasingly will place indirect burdens on
-;.
the free exercise of religion.
Perhaps all the Court should
require is that laws

·- ----

applicable, with no intent to discriminate against particular

----

------·--

---------I

-------------~--~

religious beliefs or against religion in general.
(CJ, BRW, WHR, and JPS)

1

~

Four Justices

ave now adopted this position.

The Court is now sharply divided on the p 1roper standard

i
~!he
1

~i

for resolving Free Exercise claims, at least when

challenged

government action imposes only an indirect burden on the
religion.

Therefore, the Court probably should consider another

Free Exercise case in the near future.

Jensen may be a good

vehicle for addressing the First Amendment issue because the
battle lines already are well-drawn.

If you decide that the

compelling state interest standard is appropriate, I believe that
you will

~e

able to join Justice O'Connor's decision "as is."

If

you wait for another case, and then decide to stick with
precedent, the Court may be fragmented.

It is very likely that

so•c,

there will be some disagreement among you,

WJB, TM, and HAB

over whether the refusal to make a religious exemption is
justified by a "compelling state interest."

If you decide to

adopt the Chief's position, of course, it will make little
difference what case the Court takes.
The Chief's letter mentioned another case that was held
for Jensen, Heekber-v. Roy, -

No.

84-1944.

I am surprised that the

Chief does not want to hear that case rather than have Jensen
reargued.

--

---

In Roy, the appellees refused to comply with a

requirement that participants in two federal programs (AFDC and
Food Stamps) furnish the responsible state agencies with the
social security numbers of household members.

The appellees,

American Indians, believe that the repeated use of their
daughter's social security number will "rob her of her spirit."
This belief apparently is derived "[p]artly from intuition,
partly from hearing other Abenaki Indians speak,

[and] partly

from what [the appellants] read about religious teachings."
~':I

DC for the MD of Pa held that the SSN

.......---

requirement ~ blaced

The

an

impermissible burden on appellants' First Amendment right to
freely exercise their religion.

/

In Roy, the DC made the following findings:
[1] The social security number is an important tool of
federal and state agencies to reduce the misdirection
of benefits in the food stamp and AFDC programs.
[2] Studies by HHS indicate overpayments of $25,000,000
on an annual basis while USDA has estimated that, in
fiscal year 1981, $1,000,000 in benefits were
attributable to payments to persons ineligible for the
program overpayments to eligible persons.
[3] The efficient operation of these programs requires
the use of computer systems that utilize unique
numerical identifiers such as the social security
number.
Given these findings, I believe that you could vote to reverse
ven if you adhere to the "compelling state interest" standard.
If the Chief wants to minimize the probability that he will be
writing a dissent next year, he should let Jensen go and vote to
probable jurisdiction in Roy.
If I can do anything else to help you decide what to do
about these two cases, please let me know.

.'

June 4, 1985

f-1_,. 1/()

83-1944 Jensen v. Quaring

Dear Chief:
This refers to your letter inquiring whether I
would move to reargue this case. As I havA not taken any
part in the cases that ~~ere argued dur i.ng my absence, I
think it best for me not to depart from this precedent. You
may remember, also, that when Bill Rehnquist ann I came on
the Court similar questions arose and we declined to vote
for rehearings. ~he only exception was in the abortion
cases when we talked t:o Harry Blackmun and found that he
preferred a rearqumPnt. He wanted additional time during
the summer to work on an opinion.
I am puzzl~d that: you had rather have Jensen rearguerl than to note in Heckler v. Roy, 84-1944 - a case being
held for Jensen. I will qladly vote to note orobabJe iuriscHction in Rov. It oresents substiinti.allv the same question
involving a claimed religious belief of American Indians. I
believe that the chances of your views prevailing would be
at least as good - if not better. - in Rov than on reargument
of Jensen.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

'1 •• of~·

June 13, 1985

Court ................... .

l-•oted on ................ ·r • 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned ................. 1. , 19 .. .

Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced .. . .. . .......... , 19 .. .

No.

84-780

HECKLER, SEC. OF H&HS
vs.
ROY

HOLD
FOR

JURISDI CTIONAL
STATEME NT

CERT.
G

D

Burger, Ch. J .. . ......... . ... .
Brennan, J .............. . .... .

N

POST

DI S

M ERITS

AFF

RE V

.!. ..... ........... .
•

•••••

0

••

0.

0

v'

•••

0

•

White, J .. . . . . ........ . ...... .

.V. ... ... ....... .

Marshall, J .................. .

. ........ .... V.
v

Blackmun, J ................. .
Powell, J .................... .

•

0

••

v

0.

0

•

•

•••••

O'Conno~

'

.

J . . ........................ .

0

.

'J ··············

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Stevens, J ........................... .

0

v'

/ '"''''"

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

lfp/ss 12/27/85

ROY SALLY-POW

84-780 Heckler v. Roy (DC Pa.)
(Argument, January 14, 1986)
MEMO TO CABELL:
Following

our

discussion

DC

is

dead

wrong,

though

can

I

morning,

have

I

think the decision of

I

taken a quick look at the case.
the

this

understand

how

the

application of the "least restrictive means" prong of the
standard can be argued as it was resolved by the DC.
The

DC

found

'"'-...
I

\__)

requiring

that

the

government's

interest

in

-··

that recipients of Social Security benefits be

identified

by

Social

Security

numbers

is

compelling.

Although respondent now argues that under the facts of the
case

the government's

Thomas v.
have

no

interest is not compelling

Review Board and
difficulty

in

Sherbert v.

agreeing

that

Verner) ,
the

(citing
would

I

interest

is

compelling.
Whether
requirement of
restrictive"
government

"means"

inquiry

numbers

and

may

rather
is

detect

be

more

persuasively

essential
fraud,

namely

employed

identification numbers -

argues

identifying
prevent

the

to
and

the

meets the

"least

difficult.

The

that

verify

the

use

of

eligibility,

promote

efficient

,·

l.

administration
No

less

of

the

massive

restrictive

and

Social

Security

effective

means

programs.
has

been

identified.
The
aren 1 t

really
very

DC

few

views

and

necessary

religious
those

as

appellees
in

cases

sects will
the

of

argue

that

like

hold

this

the

same

numbers

one

because

or

similar
that

namely,

family,

Roy

the

computerized numbers violate their religious beliefs based
on the "legend of Katahdin".

In other words, the DC - and

again appellees - make the argument that where only a few
people hold particular religious beliefs

\.__.,.'

that

the

amount of

Amendment

fraud

religious

(with the result

will not be great)

rights

merit

their First

protection.

The

corollary to this argument is that where a large number of
people

hold

some

increasing

the

likelihood

of

may

be

particular

religious

administrative
fraud,

justified.

a

burden

and

restriction of

As

the

SG 1 s

belief,

thereby

enhancing

the

religious beliefs

brief

observes,

this

argument "defies common sense".
You might take a look, Cabell,
memo

to

me

of

June

6

in

83-1944

(attached to the papers in this case)

at Lee Bentley 1 s

Jensen

v.

Quaring

in which Lee thinks

that we could decide this type of case on the ground that

..

~

.

.:S.

requirements such as
may

be

sustained

this,

if

involving millions of people,

they

are

facially

neutral

and

uniformly applied with no intent to discriminate against
particular

religious

general.
and JPS)

beliefs

Lee notes that four

or

against

Justices

have adopted this position.

religion

in

(the CJ, BRW, WHR

I am not sure about

JPS, and the CJ's opinion in Jensen- that did not command
a Court - did not adopt this line of reason.

It does have

appeal to me.
1 have not

taken a look at any of the cases, but

the one I had in mind when we spoke - and that I could not
identify

is

involved

an

United

Amish

States

claim

for

v.

Lee,

an

u.s.

455

exemption

252.

from

It

paying

Social Security taxes, and may be helpful if I vote - as I
am inclined to do - to reverse the DC.
I
written

by

do
the

note,

Cabell,

Pennsylvania

that

the

Civil

appellee's

Liberties

Union

brief
(and

therefore well written) makes a new argument, namely, that
the decision below may be affirmed on statutory grounds.
See

the

brief.

summary of
1

would

this

argument

appreciate

on p.

your

7 of appellee's

views

as

to

this.

Certainly we didn't Note this case to address this ground,

4.

'-/-~~
P>1.--

~/l;:pc!_~

-~~~
~J-L4,._.

and 1 do not recall it being argued.

1t

is not included

in the question presented.
In
easier

to

sum,

Cabell

-

affirm

than

to

as

you

reverse

indicated
the

DC

if

it may be
one

relies

strictly on the formalistic type of analysis found it many
of our prior cases.
programs are

But where massive federal government

involved

(the SG says that nearly 4 million

families are receiving AFDC payments each month, involving
some

million

11

persons

and

billions

of

dollars),

it

sense to start down the road of exempting
from

the

number,
__........
now

quite

simple

requirement

of

an

identification

each person who claims to belong to some of the

numerous

and

apparently

increasing

number

of

religious beliefs and sects.
But apart

from my simmering sense of

with claims like this one I
judgment.

1

would

would like your

particularly

like for

impatience
independent

you to suggest

how we can best frame a test that will attract the votes
of

four

other

Justices.

The

key

vote may well be John

Stevens, and after the argument 1 may talk to him.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

·.
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number,
~
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each person who claims

numerous
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an

identification

to belong to some of the

apparently

increasing

number

of

religious beliefs and sects.
But apart

from my simmering sense of

with claims like this one
judgment.

I

would

I

would like your
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like for

impatience
independent

you to suggest

how we can best frame a test that will attract the votes
of

four

other

Justices.
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key

vote may well be John

Stevens, and after the argument I may talk to him.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

January 2, 1986

Cabell
No. 84-780, Heckler v. Roy

~

from D Pa.

(Muir, J.)

Tuesday, January 14
(1st case)
.,

Question Presented
Did the district court err

in exempting appellees,

who

hold a sincere religious belief that social security numbers are
a great evil, from the requirement that recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps must provide
the government with their social security numbers?

BACKGROUND

·' I
·1

Appellees are the parents of the
the Snow.

infant Little Bird of

They subscribe to a religious belief that the use of

~

social security numbers

(SSNs)

by governmental agencies compro-

mises the individuality of a believer and robs the spirit.

This

belief apparently is an amalgam of Native American religious tradition, legend, and appellees' intuition.
Appellee Karen Miller,
ceived

a

SSN

American,

a

Little

cautioned

case

reviewer

at

Little

Bird.

against

Accordingly,

agencies.
when

for

the mother,

providing

appellees
the

applied for

Bird's
the

SSN

declined

Pennsylvania

father,

to

to

and rea

Native

governmental

provide

Department of

the

SSN

Public

Welfare discovered that Little Bird's application lacked the number.

See 42

u.s.c.

§

602(a) (25)

and 7

u.s.c.

§

2025(e), requir-

ing participants in AFDC and Food Stamp programs to furnish SSNs
to state welfare agencies.

As a

result,

the agency

term ina ted

the AFDC benefits for Little Bird and instituted proceedings for
a pro-rata decrease in the family's Food Stamp benefits.
Appellees brought suit

in the District of Pennsylvania

against the State Department of Welfare, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, and the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, challenging the constitutionality of the SSN requirement
as applied to them.
cerning

their

At trial, appellees introduced evidence con-

religious

evidence explaining

beliefs,

and

the purposes of

the

defendants

the SSN requirement

administration of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs.

•'

introduced
in

the

Jo

At
J.)

the conclusion of

fi~ct,.~

made

trial,

~~ I

the district ,court
I

including the following:

(Muir,

'f

69.
The use of computer 'cross-matching' can significantly reduce erroneous payments in these [Social
Security and AFDC] programs .
11

.. 70.
Social security
program cross-matching.

numbers

are

very

useful

for

71. Requiring social security numbers for children
enhances the agencies' ability to detect non-existent
children on the basis of cross-matches with school enrollment and other files.
11

.. 74.
Without the provision of social security numbers in these programs, cross-matching would be more
difficult to perform ...
The district court concluded,

however,

that failure

to

provide a social security number would not .. render cross matching
impossible ...

---,

Therefore,

the

district

court

upheld

appellees'

objection to the use of Little Bird 's SSN, granted them relief
from the SSN requirement, and enjoined the defendants from denying benefits for Little Bird and from disseminating Little Bird's
already established SSN.

11.

DISCUSSION
A.

the

Both parties characterize

.. compelling state

interest -

the proper

legal test as

least restrictive alternative ..

test: infringement by the government on the exercise of religious
freedom is permissible only if the government is motivated by a

_____.

compelling interest and its infringement is the least restrictive
alternative.
tive

means ..

Debate here centers on whether the .. least
should

be determined

by

looking

at

the

~estric-

individual

applicant or

1 find

the program as a whole.
~

I

th_
~_l-;q.t-t_t_e_r_l_
· s_ _t he

clear choice.

I·

~

B.

Lee

Bentley's

memo of

June

6,

1985,

i

proposes

that

the Court decide the case on a more restrictive First Amendment

~est

than

the

Court

has

adopted

before.

Under

the

suggested

~ standard, a requirement would be upheld if it is facially neutral
and uniformly applied without intent to discriminate against relig ious beliefs.

1 agree

that

this

standard has great appeal,

and there may be a majority to support this idea.

Justice Ste-

vens has expressed his support for placing an "almost insuperable
obstacle"

in

the way of a citizen who objects

to a

"valid and

neutral law generally applied."

, - - ?t..of- ~~
The statutory basis for affirming proposed by appel-

c.

lees breaks down upon closer inspection.

The provisions cited by

appellees are general "non-discrimination" sections that prohibit
direct

interference with the exercise of religion.

They do not

answer the ultimate question here of whether the SSN requirement
infringes on appellee's free exercise of religion.

A.

Least Restrictive Means Test

-----

Both sides agree that the proper legal _.test - at least
as

the case

have

a

law currently stands -

compelling

need

and

means of meeting the need.

must

is that the government must
employ

the

least

restrictive

The r ~ ebat3 centers over whether

that analysis should focus on an individual petition for an exception8
population

on
of

the

administration of

beneficiaries.

1t

the

is of

program
course

to the entire

easier

to prove

-'•

that there is a "less restrictive means" available in administer-

1

ing only one person's benefits than in overseeing a program having 383 million accounts.
The

district court's

opinion

would consider "the Plaintiffs'

stated

that

the

analysis

interests as against the govern-

ment 's

interest

in this particular case as well as the govern-

ment 's

interest

in the social security number

general matter."

Jurisdictional

Statement

requirement as a

18a.

1 do not know

what weights the district court would have assigned to these interests,

and the district court never

reached

the

"government's

interest" in the SSN requirement "as a general matter."
ample,

in

cern),

the district court stated:

such

talking

about

cross-matching

is

interstate

impossible,

matching

(a

For ex-

"general"

con-

"In any event, assuming that
the

possibility

that

Little

Bird of the Snow or some other individual could fraudulently obtain welfare benefits

in

interstate context as a

two different states or

in some other

result of exempting Little Bird of the

Snow from the social security number requirement in this case is
extremely remote" (emphasis added).
The SG argues that the least restrictive means should be
assessed with respect to the program as a whole, not by a caseby-case analysis.

As your memo of December 27th states, although

members of a tiny sect may obtain an exclusion under the district
court's

reasoning,

where

large

belief,

..

a

"[t]he

number

corollary

of people hold

to

this

argument

some particular

is

that

religious

thereby increasing the administrative burden and enhanc-

ing the likelihood of fraud,

a restriction of reli~ious beliefs

i

may be justified ...

The logical support for asssessing the least restrictive
means with respect to the administration of
------------~------..____

~ ar,

,.programmatic test 11 )

the ~~ ntire program~(a

~~·

but the

7

leg ~ not.

The

SG argues the legality of its ,.programmatic,. test by analogy to
some tax cases,

where the Court allegedly rejected the proposi-

tion ,.that religious exemptions to the payment of taxes should be
granted

unless

the

government

is able

such exemptions would cause the
Appellant's Brief 30.
that

the

allowed

11

tax

to

the

tax

function

if

system because

The Court held

denominations were
tax

payments were

spent in a manner that violates their religious beliefs ...
/

States v.

Lee,

455

u.s.

252,

few

income tax system to collapse ...

That reading is overbroad.

system could not

challenge

to show that even a

260

(1982).

United

1 have been unable to

find firm support for the ,.programmatic test,. in the Court's free
Perhaps this limitation has contributed to the

exercise cases.
Court's

impatience in this area and some Justices'

different standard.

B.

--------

Uniforml

A F

o of June 6 pro
can

advance

search for a

a

that a legislature

compelling governmental

application of a

facially

neutral

interest

requirement,

through
even

quirement infringes upon some religious beliefs.
specifically
Chief Justice.

asked about

if

uniform
the

re-

Your memo has

the views of Justice Stevens and

the

I

•

?-.a. )1 £,
/

Justice

Stevens,

in

I

Lee,

supra,

charac,terized

the

Court's holding as "a standard that places an almos J insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribers (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."

Id., at 263 n. 3.

Justice Stevens also believes that

"there is virtually no room for a
emption'

'constitutionally required ex-

on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is en-

tirely neutral in its general application."
language

in

vote

the

for

footnote

three

"valid and

Id., at 263.

Other

suggests that Justice Stevens would

neutral

law of general

applicability"

outside of tax cases.
You have also wondered about the Chief Justice's position on the "facially neutral and uniformly applicable" standard.

v

I have obtained a copy of the Jensen draft from the Super Clerk, ~
,.,..~

and

there

the

Chief

that

argues

a

compelling

state

interest

1 .

•

~j'

where challenged legislati n makes a ~
unlawful.

person's

Where, as here, the stat-

ute imposes only an indirect or incidental burden, the Chief has
suggested that a
be

enforced

if

"neutral and uniformly applicable" statute may
it

represents

"reasonable

means

of promoting

a

legitimate public interest" (his words).
As the dissent in the Jensen draft and Lee Bentley have
pointed out, this approach is an arguably break with the Court's
past free exercise cases.

I am, however, sympathetic with these

views, especially in the light of the proliferation of religious
sects and the increasingly great number of perceived "intrusions"

0

Vo

into

their

{who would

beliefs

SSNs

thought

have

I

were

a

great

l,

evil?) .

c.

UA> -

Affirmance on Statutory Grounds

provisions

that

either

h.-

~

thi ~an

The appellees have argued that
district court's decision on

J/L.

, ~~~~~~----~
affirm the

the strength of various statutory

prohibit

welfare

agencies

from

denying

benefits on the basis of religion or afford religious protections
explicitly to Native Americans.
§

u.s.c.

See 42

§

2000d; 7

u.s.c.

2020 {c).
Appellees

provisions

first

requiring

attempt

to

undercut

the

force

of

Appellees correctly point out

SSNs.

the
that

the overriding goal of the AFDC and Food Stamp programs was to
provide

u.s.c.
a

for
§

impoverished

2011.

means of

payment of

See

families.

42

u.s.c.

§

601 and

7

The SSN requirement in AFDC has, inter alia, been

an optional search
benefits was

not,

for
and

an absentee
is

not,

father,

and

the

conditioned upon the

mother's active assistance in this search.

It does not follow,

as appellees argue, that the payments are also not conditioned on
the provision of a SSN.
cate otherwise.

The explicit terms of the statute indi-

Moreover,

even if true,

this argument does not

address the Food Stamp program's SSN requirement.
In

1981 Congress

changed

the

Food Stamp program's SSN

provision from "The Secretary • . . may {1) require" to "The Secretary

shall

{ 1)

require"

SSNs.

See

7 U.S .c.

§

2025 {e) .

Appellees denigrate the provision because it was part of a farming bill with price supports, but Food Stamps are under the De-

"\

\1

I

partment of Agriculture.

Appellants concede that tbe change was
II

1'1

part of an effort "focused on preventing abuse of the program."
Appellees'

Brief

13.

Therefore

the AFDC requirement,

1 believe

is entitled

to

this provision,

like

its ordinary meaning

that

recipients must provide their SSNs.
The statutory provisions within the AFDC and Food Stamps
programs
claim

that appellees cite

creed,

their

free exercise

(prohibiting denial of benefits on the basis of religion)

are general
grams

in support of

statements enjoining

those who administer

from discriminating on the basis of race,
national

origin,

or

political

beliefs.

the pro-

sex,

religious

Such

statutory

ernment funds or services, and Title 42 has at least five analogous

provisions

for

fair

housing,

disaster

assistance,

non-

nuclear research and development, community economic development,
and Head Start.
1 consider

these

provisions

statutory

boilerplate.

1

believe these provisions encompass only a direct denial because
of reigion, and do not address cases like this one, where a statute's effect is only indirect.
means of deciding

the case

To rely on these provisions as a

_____..

simply begs the question of whether

appellees have been denied benefits "on the basis" of their religion.

~

Moreover,

to affirm on these provisions would open up a

host of religious challenges.

Future litigants could argue that

other requirements have an indirect upon their free exercise of
religion, and thereby constitute a denial of benefits in contravention of statute.

'I'

..LVo

provision concerning

The
gious

beliefs

expresses

a

Native

policy of

American

"protect [ ing]

I

•

reli-

J.nchan
'I

and preservto
42

u.s.c.

§

1996.

The unusually complete legislative history states

that the provision was enacted to countermand government regulations that interfered with "traditional Indian rites"
venting the

(~,

pre-

Indians from entering sacred glades because of cer-

tain tourist regulations; confiscating ancient eagle head dresses
because of wildlife conservation regulations; prohibiting use of
peyote in ceremonies because of the substance's use in cities as
a halluc inigen) •

I believe that this provision is i

to the present case because § 1996, on its face, covers only tra~
--

ditional

religions:

~

ition."

appellees'

religion

is

from

their

"intu-

Moreover, the provision is meant to cover only obviously

needless interference with religious beliefs from an unanticipated application of regulations.

For example, the legislative his-

tory refers to the confiscation, under color of wildlife conservation laws,

of certain tribal skins and artifacts even though

these artifacts were obtained long before
the statute.

the enactment of

the

The legislative history suggests that Indians would

not be permitted today to kill an endangered species.

I there-

fore believe that § 1996 does not exempt appellees from the SSN
requirement.

III.

CONCLUSION

-L.J..•

A formalistic

reading

district court's opinion.
is wrong.

This Court

of

the

I believe,

cases
however,

I

would,·( support

the

that'\ the opinion

should reverse either on the basis of a

"programmatic compelling need" or on the basis of a standard similar to the Chief's "facially neutral, uniformly applied" standard.

January 2, 1986

Cabell

Bench Mem.

84-780

HECKLER v. ROY

Argued 1/14/86
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 12, 1986

/
84-780 - Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief,
I shall await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

Jn.vrtntt QIDttrl d tqt lfuittb .:italt.tr
Jla,g£rington, ~. <q. 211~'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

March 14, 1986

No. 84-780

Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief,
I plan to write a dissent in this case and
will circulate something within two or three weeks if
all goes well.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

..

~

jtu;rrtntt <!fourt of tqt~b ,jbdte

'llaslfington. ~.

<If.

20p'!-~

CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 14, 1986

Re:

No. 84-780-Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief:
I

await the dissent.
Sincerely,

/.h(_
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

,

The Conference

..

'.

.iu:prmtt OJttnri of tl{t ~tb _itaftg
..Mfringhm. ~. Qf. 211,?~$

/

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 14, 1986
Re:

No. 84-780

Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely,
[A)lP'./

The Chief Justice
cc:

,

The Conference

~

.

\

'\

I

''I
l

March 17, 1986

84-780 Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief:
I have now had the opportunity to review your draft
in this case. 1 am in agreem~nt with your baRic position,
but have concerns that t share with you privately.
The draft identifies several grounds for reversing
the District Court. It does emphasize a "facially neutral,
uniformly applicable" test, first articulated on page 5. As
you later point out on page 9, a neutral and uniformly applicable statute may be enforced if it represents a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest. 1 am
in agreement. This test provides the Court with a stanoard
that protects religious free~om without hamqtringing the
government in the face of the proliferation of religious
sects and the increasingly great number of perceived "intrusions" into religious freedom.
I would not state alternate tests.
Reltance on the
wholly neutral nature of the Social Security number resolves
this case. The "benefits vs. prohibition" test mentioned on
pages 6-8 is unnecessary, and also raises questions for me.
lt may well be that a "denial of governmental benefits"
sometimes could constitute an "infringement of religious
liberty." Moreover, although it may be true that denial of
benefits is less intrusive than affirmative compulsion or
prohibition, 1 do not think that necessarily answers the
question in this case.

1 agree generally with your discussion of Yoder,
Thomas, and Sherbert, and with your emphasis on pages 10-12
of the Social Security numbers' importance in the computerassisted administration of a large and complex program.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CH I EF JUSTICE

March 27, 1986
RE:

No. 84-780 -- Bowen v. Roy

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your memo on this case. I believe I am in
general accord with your views that denial of government benefits
may sometimes constitute an infringement of religious liberty. I
have added language in the revised draft to make this view
explicit. See page 8.
The reason for discussing the fact that this is a benefits
case, not a criminal sanctions case, is to focus the op1n1on
narrowly on the precise question presented. I am concerned that
removing that limitation might unduly expand the holding, to the
ultimate detriment of Free Exercise claimants. In other words,
the facially neutral nature of the provisions at issue here
combined with the fact that this is a benefits case ~ produce the
result. I do not intend to suggest that one without the other
would "necessarily answer the case," and I think the opinion is
clear on this point. I have, however, added discussion
concerning the Bob Jones Universit~ case, which I hope will
satisfy your concern that the opin1on creates some kind of new
"benefits v. prohibition" "test". Seep. 8. I have also added
modifying language to statements that might appear to discuss
benefits alone. See p. 6.
Since I think we are in general agreement on the issues
here, I hope you will join. I will, as always, be happy to
entertain any further suggestions that you might have.

(
'

I
Justice Powell

. ·.·.

·"' •
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE

w .. . ..J .

BRENNAN, ..JR.

March 28, 1986

No. 84-780
Bowen v. Roy, et al.

Dear Sandra,
Please join me in your dissent in
the above.
Sincerely,

/LJ'
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

March 31, 1986

No. 84-780 - Bowen v. Roy

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

.'

The Conference

April 3, 1986

84-780 Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief:

PleaRe join me.
Sincerely,

~he

Chief Justice

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS 01'"

April 11, 1986

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

9~~

Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

No. 84-780, Bowen v. Rol

Although John has not
evident that we are all
assumption that John w'
advisable to have a
ief
used on other occasion •
The

~

:;:~~

ye:_t:,_. :e:.x~..&.to'-~~
!
h~inal
r

the

t._ 1-

for your c

"The judgment of the District Court is vacated and
the case remanded. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS
agree that the Government's use, dissemination, and continued possession of the social security number it already possesses for appellees' daughter should not be
enjoined, and that the remainder of the relief ordered by
the District Court should also be vacated. If, however,
it becomes evident at any further hearing that appellees'
religious convictions still prevent them from supplying
the Government with a social security number for their
daughter, JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR agree that,
on the facts as determined by the District Court, the
Government should be enjoined from denying assistance to
appellees' daughter for that reason."
Of course, this would have to be modified if it does not reflect
John's views.
I trust · I am not regarded as being officious in suggesting
something of this kind.

.iuJJUmt (ij.rurt Gf tlrt ~b i'bdte
'llhte~n. ~. (ij. 2.llpl!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 1, 1986

Re:

No. 84-780-Bowen v. Roy

Dear Sandra:
I

am still with you.
Sincerely,

;#'.
T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

jbpttm:t Ql&mri nf tltt ~nittlt i'tatt•
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 9, 1986

.,

Re:

84-780 - Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief:
With respect t~ your reworking of Part II, I
will not only "salute" you; I will join you. With
respect to Part III, however, I remain unpersuaded
that the remaining issue--what the government can
require when it already has the social security
number it seeks--is ripe for review. Perhaps the
answer to the hypothetical question that the record
does not present is so easy that it is appropriate to
go ahead and discuss it, but I am inclined to think
that when there is a significant disagreement within
the Court on such an issue--even when the answer
appears obvious to the respective disputants--the
better practice is to avoid the unnecessary
discussion of constitutional issues. I shall
therefore recast the second part of my separate
writing and merely join your Parts I and II.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

t
•··

May 10, 1986

84-780 Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief:
This refers to your revised Fifth Draft of an
opinion for the Court. 1 am still with you.
Sincerely,

The Chief

Justic~

lf.p/ss

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBER S OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 13, 1986
Re:

No. 84-780

Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief,
I am still with you.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

"'·.''

The Conference

,juvrtmt <!fourt ttf tqt ~ittlt Jtatt.s-

'·

Jlufrittgton. ~.Of. 2ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 14, 1986

No. 84-780

Bowen v. Roy

Dear Chief,
You have made a number of changes in your
opinion in this case and I intend to make some changes
in my opinion as a result. Because I will attend the
Sixth Circuit Conference this week in Memphis, I need
to have the case held over another week to have time
to spend on the changes I want to make.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 5, 1986

Re:

84-780 - Bowen v. Roy

Dear Sandra:
In response to y~ur latest circulation, I am adding the
following footnote at the end of my opinion:
Although both THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR explain why they believe the case is not moot,
neither explains why it is ripe. JUSTICE O'CONNOR also
incorrectly states that I believe the case should be
remanded. JUSTICE O'CONNOR's error may reflect the
difficulties that inhere when one Justice takes it upon
herself or himself to explain the views of the Justices
who have not joined the writer's opinion. Cf.
California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 301, n. 5
(1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("'it is hardly
necessary to state that only a majority can speak for
the Court' or give an authoritative explanation of the
meaning of its judgments•).
Respectfully,

)L
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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